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How the London Metal Exchange’s Nickel Market Broke Down in March 2022

A system walkthrough of the nickel short squeeze, clearing stress, trade cancellation, and subsequent reforms.

How the London Metal Exchange’s Nickel Market Broke Down in March 2022

On 8 March 2022, the London Metal Exchange suspended trading in nickel after its three-month contract rose above $100,000 per metric ton. It then canceled trades executed after midnight that day. The episode was not just a rapid price move. It joined a concentrated short position, limited visibility into over-the-counter exposures, thin overnight liquidity, escalating margin calls, disabled price controls, and a clearing system facing potential member defaults.

Official reviews agree on much of that sequence. They differ, or leave room for dispute, on what alternatives were feasible and how costs should have been distributed. A British court upheld the exchange's legal authority to cancel the trades. In 2025, the Financial Conduct Authority fined the LME £9.2 million for failures in systems and controls before the suspension. Legal validity, regulatory compliance, and market legitimacy are related questions, not identical ones.

The contract connected physical metal to financial obligations

The LME nickel contract is physically deliverable. Producers, consumers, merchants, and financial firms use it to hedge or speculate on future prices. A producer expecting to sell nickel can take a short futures position: if the market price falls, gains on the contract can offset lower revenue from metal. If the price rises, the short position loses value even if the producer's physical inventory becomes more valuable.

Clearing changes when those gains and losses are paid. LME Clear stands between clearing members and collects margin to manage the risk that a member defaults. Positions are marked to market, so a sharp rise produces cash calls on short positions. Clients may have economic assets or future production but still lack liquid cash at the required hour. Their brokers and clearing members remain responsible to the clearinghouse.

The physical nickel market added a mismatch. LME warehouses accepted specified forms of high-purity Class I nickel. Much growth in production had come from Class II products used in stainless steel and battery supply chains but not directly deliverable against the contract. The LME price remained a global reference, while the stock available for delivery and the exposures hedged through the contract did not map neatly onto total nickel production.

War risk met a large short position

Nickel prices had already been rising before Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Russia was an important supplier of high-purity nickel, and fear of sanctions or disruption tightened expectations. The Oliver Wyman review commissioned by the LME found that declining exchange stocks, market concentration, and uncertainty about supply contributed to vulnerability.

A major short position associated with the Chinese producer Tsingshan and related entities amplified the move. Significant parts of the exposure existed over the counter through several banks. The LME saw positions held on its venues and received some reports, but it did not have a timely consolidated view of the full economic short. Fragmentation across counterparties reduced the ability of any one institution to assess the squeeze.

As prices rose on 7 March, LME Clear issued margin calls totaling about $7.05 billion, according to the High Court's later reconstruction. Three clearing members missed the 9 a.m. deadline; one remained in default through the day. The clearinghouse paused further intraday calls after 1 p.m., temporarily limiting liquidity demands while leaving exposure to the changing price.

Short sellers buying contracts to close positions can push prices higher, producing more margin calls and more urgent buying. That feedback is a short squeeze. It does not mean every purchase was forced or that the price had a single cause. War news, scarce liquidity, discretionary trading, and hedging interacted.

The overnight market outran the controls

LMEselect, the exchange's electronic system, continued trading during Asian hours. Liquidity was thinner than during the London day. In the early hours of 8 March, prices climbed rapidly. The High Court judgment records a price above $60,000 around 4:49 a.m., above $100,000 by 6 a.m., and a peak of $101,365 at 6:08.

The exchange had price bands intended to reject orders too far from a reference price. Staff suspended those bands during the surge because they were generating repeated blocks and operational concern. Removing them allowed transactions at still higher prices. The FCA's 2025 final notice concluded that the LME lacked adequate controls and failed to respond properly to the volatility before 8:15 a.m., when trading was suspended.

By then, prices used for settlement would have produced extraordinary margin calls. The Office of Financial Research later estimated that, absent cancellation, 12 of 45 clearing members could have defaulted and the clearinghouse's default fund could have been exhausted. This is a modeled counterfactual based on positions and obligations; it explains the systemic-risk concern but does not show that each default would necessarily have occurred after emergency financing or other action.

Cancellation protected the clearing chain and reversed completed gains

The LME suspended nickel trading at 8:15 a.m. and later canceled transactions executed on or after midnight. The cancellation returned the market to the previous day's closing price for relevant purposes. Long traders who had sold at high prices lost booked gains; short traders and their intermediaries avoided the corresponding losses and margin obligations.

The exchange argued that prices had become disorderly and disconnected from the underlying physical market, and that allowing the trades to stand threatened defaults and the market as a whole. Critics argued that retrospective cancellation undermined finality and favored participants caught short. Both descriptions identify real distributional effects. Preventing a clearing failure does not make the canceled counterparties unharmed; honoring trades does not make the consequences for the clearing system irrelevant.

Elliott Associates and Jane Street challenged the decision in court. In November 2023, the High Court rejected their claims, finding that the LME had acted within its rules and that the decision was lawful in the extreme circumstances. The judgment assessed public-law and human-rights arguments. It did not declare cancellation an economically costless or generally desirable market tool.

Trading remained suspended through 15 March. The attempted reopening on 16 March suffered technical problems and rapid limit moves. Daily price limits, introduced during the recovery, became a lasting part of the LME's controls.

Reviews found a system with incomplete visibility

Oliver Wyman's independent review identified several interacting weaknesses rather than one mistaken button press. The exchange lacked a complete picture of large over-the-counter positions. Its monitoring did not adequately combine conditions in the physical market, low stocks, member liquidity, and concentration. Overnight trading could generate prices in thin liquidity, while margin and governance processes were not designed for the speed and scale of the move.

The Bank of England supervised LME Clear, while the FCA supervised the exchange. Their April 2022 joint statement opened reviews and emphasized governance, risk management, and member positions. The Bank later required LME Clear to strengthen governance, margin arrangements, and default management. The FCA's enforcement focused on the exchange's failure to have effective volatility controls during the relevant period.

The LME responded with permanent daily price limits, enhanced position reporting, greater monitoring of over-the-counter exposures, revised accountability levels, and work on margin and market structure. It also accelerated routes for additional brands of Class I nickel to become deliverable, seeking to increase stocks and improve the contract's connection to physical supply.

These reforms target observed weaknesses, but their effects involve trade-offs. Price limits slow a move and give participants time to find liquidity; they can also delay price discovery and trap traders who need to exit. More reporting improves oversight while adding cost and depending on accurate, timely aggregation. Higher margin protects the clearinghouse but increases participants' liquidity needs, potentially concentrating the market among firms able to fund them.

What the episode establishes

The nickel crisis was not evidence that a futures price can be cleanly separated from finance and returned to a single “physical reality.” Futures prices are formed by orders, constraints, information, and contract design. In March 2022, that process became disorderly because concentrated exposures and thin liquidity interacted with clearing obligations faster than the exchange's controls could manage.

It is established that the LME suspended trading, canceled eight hours of transactions, and faced credible concerns about clearing-member defaults. Independent, judicial, and regulatory records document gaps in visibility and controls. It remains contested whether earlier intervention would have prevented the crisis, whether another resolution could have preserved more trade finality, and how much confidence the cancellation permanently cost.

The narrow lesson is about system design. A market can collect collateral against visible positions and still miss risk distributed outside its venue. A clearinghouse can reduce bilateral counterparty risk while concentrating the consequences of a common shock. Rules for an emergency matter before the emergency because, once prices move, every available action reallocates losses.

Sources consulted

4 sources, every one with a link you can follow.

  1. Oliver Wyman, “Independent Review of Events in the Nickel Market in March 2022,” final report commissioned by the LME (2023).
  2. Bank of England, FCA, and PRA, “Joint Statement on the London Metal Exchange and LME Clear” (2022).
  3. Financial Conduct Authority, “Final Notice: The London Metal Exchange” (2025).
  4. U.S. Office of Financial Research, “Lessons from Trade Cancellation at the LME in March 2022” (2025).

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